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Abstract
Our purpose, is to put forward a change in the paradigm of testing by generalizing
a very natural idea exposed by Morris DeGroot (1975) aiming to an approach that
is attractive to all schools of statistics, in a procedure better suited for the needs of
science. DeGroot’s seminal idea is to base testing statistical hypothesis on minimizing
the weighted sum of type I plus type II error instead of of the prevailing paradigm which
is fixing type I error and minimizing type II error. DeGroot’s result is that in simple vs
simple hypothesis the optimal criterion is to reject, according to the likelihood ratio as
the evidence (ordering) statistics using a fixed threshold value, instead of a fixed tail
probability. By defining expected type I and type II errors, we generalize DeGroot’s
approach and find that the optimal region is defined by the ratio of evidences, that
is, averaged likelihoods (with respect to a prior measure) and a threshold fixed. This
approach yields an optimal theory in complete generality, which the Classical Theory
of Testing does not. This can be seen as a Bayes-Non-Bayes compromise: the criteria
(weighted sum of type I and type II errors) is Frequentist, but the test criterion is the
ratio of marginalized likelihood, which is Bayesian. We give arguments, to push the
theory still further, so that the weighting measures (priors)of the likelihoods does not
have to be proper and highly informative, but just predictively matched, that is that
predictively matched priors, give rise to the same evidence (marginal likelihoods) using
minimal (smallest) training samples.
The theory that emerges, similar to the theories based on Objective Bayes approaches,
is a powerful response to criticisms of the prevailing approach of hypothesis testing,
see for example Ioannidis (2005) and Siegfried (2010) among many others.
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1 Changing the Paradigm of Hypothesis Testing and
Re-visiting Bayes Factors and Likelihood Ratios
1.1 Introduction
Classical significance testing, as developed by Neyman and Pearson, is suited and was de-
signed to perform very specific comparisons, under well designed studies, on which before-
hand, based on a specified Type I error (false rejection), which is restricted to be α, and
a most powerful statistics is found so that the Type II error β is minimized. The sample
sizes are chosen so that β is bigger than or at least of the same order than α. But the vast
majority of studies do not conform to this standard. Or even if individual studies conform
to the standard, merging studies no longer do. Fixing Type I error, for whatever amount of
evidence and fixed tables of p-values are not justifiable (at least when there is an explicit or
implicit alternative hypothesis), since then the Type II error is completely outside of control,
with the possibility that Type I error may be enormous as compared with Type II error.
There is the need for an alternative paradigm to: i) Fix Type I error at α and Minimize
Type II error, or ii) Calculate p-value and interpret it as the minimum α for which you will
reject the null hypothesis, using a fixed table of values like 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***.
Morris DeGroot in his authoritative book (1975), Probability and Statistics 2nd Edition,
perhaps the best bridge between schools of statistics ever written, stated that it is more
reasonable to minimize a weighted sum of Type I and Type II error than to specify a value
of type I error and then minimize Type II error. He showed it beyond reasonable doubt,
but only in the very restrictive scenario of simple VS simple hypothesis. We propose here
a very natural generalization for composite hypothesis, by using general weight functions in
the parameter space. This was also the position taken by Pereira (1985). We show, in a
parallel manner to DeGroot’s proof and Pereira’s discussion, that the optimal test statistics
are Bayes Factors, when the weighting functions are priors with mass on the whole parameter
space and loss functions which are constant under each hypothesis. When there are areas of
indifference (namely areas of no practical importance, like ”the new drug is interesting only
if it is at least 10%, say, more effective than the gold standard”), then loss functions that are
equal to zero in the indifference region (i.e. 0 to 10%) achieve the goal of practical instead
of statistical significance.
Hypothesis testing is by far the more contentious aspect of statistics. There is no agreement
between the schools of statistics, and neither within the Bayesians or Frequentists. It is
time to shift to DeGroot’s paradigm, to meet the needs of science. We show here that the
alternative theory yields general optimal test, compared with the traditional theory on which
the existence of optimal test is rather the exception than the rule.
We present only very simple examples, for the sake of clarity of a general argument.
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1.2 Why significance test works for carefully designed studies but
not otherwise?
Designed studies for testing hypotheses following classical significance testing are based on
a careful balance between controlling Type I Error and Minimizing Type II error.
Consider the following example motivated by DeGroot (1975),Section 8.2.
Example 1:Suppose we have Normal data with scale σ0 = 3, and we are interested in
comparing two possible means:
H0 : θ = θ0 = −1 VS H1 : θ = θ1 = 1.
It is desired to design an experiment (the observations are costly) so that Type I error (False
Rejection of H0)is 0.05 and Type II error (False acceptance of H0)is 0.1. Application of the
Classical Neyman-Pearson Lemma yields, that the optimal criteria is based on the likelihood
ratio:
Reject H0 if :
x¯− (−1)
σ0/
√
n
≥ Cα.
Now the constant Cα is chosen as to have Type I Error equal 0.05, that is:
Pr(
X¯ − (−1)
σ0/
√
n
≥ Cα|H0) = α,
which is immediately recognized as the familiar Cα=0.05 = 1.645. Thus going to the Type II
requirement then
β = Pr(
X¯ − (−1)
σ0/
√
n
< 1.645|H1) = 0.1,
gives n = 19.25 so we settle for n = 20, as our designed experiment, resulting in β = 0.091.
This implies that H0 is rejected if X¯ > 0.1. Notice that in this situation α/β = 0.55, letting
about a 1 to 2 relative sizes of Type I over Type II error.
1.3 The conundrum of ”an approach bothered by good informa-
tion”
Example 1 (continued): after you gave the researchers your design, they come back to you,
and proudly give you N = 100 data, since it costed the same to produce n = 20 than
N = 100 (a situation which is not that unusual). The researchers are very satisfied with
their prolific experiment, but the statistician is disturbed. As usual Type I error is kept
fixed and equal to α = 0.05, but... What is the new Type II error? The statistician makes a
calculation and obtains that the new type II error is β = 0.00000026, or α/β = 195217, quite
different from 1 to 2 as designed. In fact the rejection region became: x¯ > −0.51. Thus if for
example the observed x¯ = −0.5 the Null Hypothesis H0 : θ = −1 is rejected in favor of an
alternative much further away to the observed value. This opens a conundrum: why more
information is a bad thing for the traditional approach of hypothesis testing?. Incidentally,
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in the perhaps more frequent situation on which information is lost, for example due to
drop-outs, for example the real sample size was really n = 10, then type II error is inflated
to β = 0.32 if α is kept fixed, unbalancing in the opposite direction type I and type II errors.
Example 1 illustrate why significance testing is inadequate for measuring the evidence in
favor or against a hypothesis in general. It is timely to go back to the essentials.
Morris DeGroot (1975), argued that instead of fixing Type I error (or computing a p-value
with an scale held fixed) and minimize Type II, a better hypothesis testing paradigm is to
choose the test as to minimize a weighted sum of the errors, namely
Minδ [a · αθ0(δ) + b · βθ1(δ)], (1)
where δ denotes the test: δ(x) = IR(x), where R is the Rejection Region of H0, IS(y) is the
indicator function, equal to 1 if and only if y ∈ S. Notice the apparently slight difference of
(1) with the traditional approach of Significance Testing of fixed significance level α0:
Restricting to those tests δ on which Type I error: αθ0(δ) ≤ α0, Minδ βθ1(δ). (2)
However, the difference is far reaching as we will see in the sequel. In the following the
superiority of DeGroot’s approach is distinctly apparent.
Example 1 (continued): In the simple vs simple hypothesis DeGroot’s proves that the
optimal test is:
Reject H0 if
f(x|θ0)
f(x|θ1) <
b
a
.
Now this approach can handle effectively any sample size, as long of course, that we are
prepared to select a and b. This has been perhaps the most important contention, not to
embrace a more balanced and sensible combination of the two types of error. The point we
make here is that the choice of b/a has been already done! To see this lets go back to the
design situation on which the sample size was chosen to be n = 20. Now for α = 0.05 and
β = 0.091, DeGroot’s rejection region is equivalent to, after some algebra, to
Reject if exp(
n
σ20
(θ1 − θ0)[(θ0 + θ1)/2− x¯]) < b
a
, (3)
and since the rejection region is x¯ > 0.1034, that is equivalent in our particular example to
− 3
2
√
20
· log( b
a
) +
√
20/3 = 1.645, obtaining b
a
= 0.63. Thus if we set a = 1, the implicit value
of b is 0.63. Now DeGroot’s approach leads to a criterion that makes sense for any sample
size, n
The Optimal Rejection Region R is: x¯ >
9
2 · n × 0.46,
with cutting point that is always positive, but approaching zero, as it is intuitively reasonable
for θ0 = −1 and θ1 = 1, and a > b. Furthermore now the ratio between α = 1 − Φ(3 ·
.23/
√
(n) +
√
n/3) and β = Φ(3 · .23/
√
(n)−√n/3) as a function of n, is extremely stable
ranging from 0.55 at n = 20 to 0.61 at n = 100. Thus we have found that an α of 0.05 for
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n = 20, is equivalent to an α of 0.00033 for n = 100. This shows how unbalanced is the usual
method of letting α unchanged whatever the information. Notice that not even changing to
α = 0.01 would have been an effective remedy for n = 100, since the equivalent α is about
thirty times lower.
NOTE: The previous analysis opens a interesting method to “decrease α with n”. Notice that
from the formula of α above, using Mill’s ratio, we get the following simple approximation:
αn ∼ 1− Φ(
√
n/σ0) ≈ φ(
√
n/σ0)√
n/σ0
, (4)
giving a clear guidance on how to decrease the scale of p-values with the sample size. Notice
how fast the p-values ought to decrease with the sample size to give a comparable amount
of surprise against the model. In Section 7 we will see that the rate of decrease is different
(much slower) for more complex tests.
1.4 The Lindley Paradox is not necessarely a difference between
Bayes and Non-Bayes but between fixed significance levels and
minimizing the weighted sum or errors
Lindley’s Paradox, Lindley (1957) has been understood as the increasing divergence (as the
information accumulates) between Classical Hypothesis Testing and Bayesian Testing evi-
dence measures. There is also a divergence between DeGroot’s and Classical testing, even
when there are no prior densities.
To se this, we go back to the motivating example, of simple hypothesis against a simple
alternative, as the simplest setting on which it emerges clearest that the discrepancy is due
to the criterion to be minimized. If you relinquish fixed significance levels, and adopt DeG-
root’s approach of minimizing the weighted sum of errors then there is a 1 to 1 relationship
with Bayesian posterior model probabilities (as it is with testing based on the Likelihood
Ratio).
To see this recall that according to minimizing the weighted sum of errors approach the
criterion is (1).
Example 1 (continued): We have in Example 1, that the optimal rejection region, ac-
cording to DeGroot’s criterion can be written as
Reject if:
x¯+ 1
σ0/
√
n
≥ 2.07
σ0
√
n
+
√
n
σ0
, (5)
to be compared to the traditional rejection rule with fixed significance levels
Reject if:
x¯+ 1
σ0/
√
n
≥ 1.645. (6)
This is the divergence or Lindley’s Paradox but among two frequentist rejection rules. It is
to be noted the striking difference in behavior of the two hand right sides: the fact is that
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under DeGroot’s criterion as n grows the type I error goes to zero (as does the Type II error,
and so consistency is achieved), but in the traditional approach the type I error is kept fixed
and consistency fails (there is a positive probability of the wrong decision, false rejection no
matter how large n is).
On the other hand, a general 1 to 1 relationship can be established between minimizing
the weighted sum of errors and the probability of the null hypothesis. For any simple VS
simple comparison, if π0 and π1 are respectively the prior probabilities of the Null and the
Alternative, then Bayes Theorem yields as the posterior probability of the Null:
P (H0|x) = π0f(x|θ0)
π0f(x|θ0) + π1f(x|θ1) = [1 +
π1f(x|θ1)
π0f(x|θ0) ]
−1. (7)
Therefore if the ratio b/a is interpreted as π1/π0, then the DeGroot’s rejection region is
equivalent with the region on which rejection of the null occurs if P (H0|x) < 0.5. No
divergence here, on the contrary a perfect correspondence.
1.5 A More General Setting
Suppose we are testing the following two general hypotheses:
H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 VS H1 : θ ∈ Θ1 (8)
We define, in the Neyman-Pearson tradition, Type I and Type II error, of the test δ at the
parameter point θ as,
αθ(δ) = Pr(Rejecting H0|θ ∈ Θ0), (9)
βθ(δ) = Pr(Accepting H0|θ ∈ Θ1). (10)
Definition: The weighted (or expected) Type I and Type II errors are defined respectively
as:
α(δ) =
∫
Θ0
αθ(δ)π0(θ)dθ, (11)
and
β(δ) =
∫
Θ1
βθ(δ)π1(θ)dθ, (12)
where πj(θ) ≥ 0 are such that
∫
Θj
πj(θ) = 1, j = 0, 1. Why the expectation?: It is important
to note that the errors depends on θ, which is obviously unknown. How to deal with it?
In Berger (2008) it is stated that: ”There are many situations in which it has been argued
that a frequentist (statistician) should use an average coverage criterion; see Bayarri and
Berger (2004) for examples and references.” Similarly we argue here that both Bayesians
and Frequentist, should average errors. Among the main reasons we have: i) averaging
errors permits a completely general theory of optimality (as we will see), ii) averaging is
natural (from a probabilistic point of view, it is the marginal error) and it is flexible, in
the choice of weight functions iii) the methodologies for assessing weighings have advanced,
see for example Pereira (1985), Berger and Pericchi (1996, 2001), iv) it is a natural mix of
Frequentist errors and Bayesian averaging.
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1.5.1 Interpretations of the weight (prior) measures
We pause here to discuss interpretations, since there are various possible interpretations of
the weight measures πj(θ), j = 0, 1.
1. Prior Measures: The most obvious is the assumed prior density of the parameter values
conditional on each hypothesis, which is the natural interpretation under a Bayesian
framework. Notice that not necessarily this interpretation leads to a subjective ap-
proach. If a general method for generating conventional priors like the Intrinsic prior
method, then this can be considered an objective approach. There is room for other
conventional priors.
2. Regions of Statistical Importance: In order to state ”statistical importance”, rather
than ”statistical significance” the weight function can be combined with a loss structure
to define ”indifference regions” on which the difference between the null and alternative
is of no practical importance. See the examples.
It turns out that under the prior measure interpretation, we obtain a Frequentist Decision
Theory justification of Bayes Factors. For the second interpretation, the decisions are based
on posterior probabilities of sets, that actually embody ”statistical importance” based rules.
Note: It is tempting, because it is so simple, to use weight functions which are point
masses in the null and the point where statistical importance starts. These are point masses
signalling specific points for which the errors ought to be controlled by design. For example
if for a particular value of θ1 ∈ Θ1, where there is ”practical significance”, for example a
novel medical treatment improvement of 20%, say, then the weight function may be set as a
point mass on 20% of improvement. (This typically would work only for monotone likelihood
ratio families). These point masses rather than being though as sensible, we consider them
for i) simplicity and ii) to compare it with frequentist solutions to the problem of ”too much
power”, that is when there is statistical significance but not practical significance (Bickel
and Doksum, 1977). However this simple solution, is not based on a reasonable prior (point
masses).
1.6 A General Optimality Result
Define the weighted likelihoods, that we may call the Evidences, for the Data = y under
each hypothesis as
̟0(y) =
∫
Θ0
f(y|θ)π0(θ)dθ, (13)
and
̟1(y) =
∫
Θ1
f(y|θ)π1(θ)dθ. (14)
Lemma 1: It is desired to find a test function δ that minimizes, for specified a > 0, and , b >
0:
SERRORS(δ) = a · α(δ) + b · β(δ). (15)
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The test δ∗ is defined as: accept H0, if
̟0(y)
̟1(y)
>
b
a
, (16)
and H1 is accepted if
̟0(y)
̟1(y)
<
b
a
, (17)
and accept any if a ·̟0(y) = b ·̟1(y). Then for any other test function δ:
SERRORS(δ∗) = a · α(δ∗) + b · β(δ∗) ≤ SERRORS(δ), (18)
in words rejecting the null when the ratio of evidences is smaller than b/a is globally optimal.
Proof: Denote by R, the rejection region of the test δ, that is those data points on whichH0 is
rejected. Then, under the mild assumptions of Fubbini’s Theorem that allows interchanging
the order of the integrals, for any test function δ,
aα(δ) + bβ(δ) = a
∫
Θ0
[
∫
R
f(y|θ)dy]π0(θ)dθ + b
∫
Θ1
[
∫
RC
f(y|θ)dy]π1(θ)dθ =
a
∫
Θ0
∫
R
f(y|θ)π0(θ)dydθ + b
∫
Θ1
∫
RC
f(y|θ)π1(θ)dydθ =
a
∫
Θ0
∫
R
f(y|θ)π0(θ)dydθ + b[1 −
∫
Θ1
∫
R
f(y|θ)π1(θ)dydθ] =
b+
∫
R
[a
∫
Θ0
f(y|θ)π0(θ)dθ − b
∫
Θ1
f(y|θ)π1(θ)dθ]dy =
b+
∫
R
[a̟0(y)− b̟1(y)]dy.
The results follows from application of the definition of δ∗ in expressions 16 and 17, since every
point on which a·̟0(y)−b·̟1(y) < 0 is in R, but no point on which a·̟0(y)−b·̟1(y) > 0,
is included. Therefore δ∗, minimizes the last term in the sum and the first does not depend
on the test. So the result has been established.
Regarding the assessment of the constants a and b, notice that it suffices to specify its ratio
b/a = r. This can be made as: i) By finding the implicit a and b of a carefully designed
experiment as in Example 1, ii) Conventional table of ratio of evidences, like in Jeffreys
Scale-Table of evidences, (See Appendix 1) or iii) by a ratio of prior probabilities of H0
times the loss incurred by false rejection of H0 over the prior probability of H1 times the
loss incurred by false acceptance of H0, in symbols, calling L0 the loss for false rejection of
H1 and L1 the loss for false rejection of H0:
r =
b
a
=
P (H1) · L0
P (H0) · L1 .
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To see this, notice that the risk function can be written as R(θ, δ) = L1αθ(δ) if θ ∈ Θ0, and
R(θ, δ) = L0βθ(δ) if θ ∈ Θ1. Assuming that a priori the probability of the Null Hypothesis
is P (H0), then the average (Bayesian) risk, taking expectations with respect to (P (H0), π0)
and ((1− p(H0)), π1), we get the averaged risk
r(δ) = P (H0) · L1 · α(δ) + (1− P (H0)) · L0 · β(δ), (19)
and it is seen that the correspondence with expression (15) is: a 7→ P (H0) · L1 and b 7→
(1− P (H0)) · L0 (assuming that the loss is constant on each of the hypothesis).
The Rejection Region R in (17) takes two different shapes according to the interpretations 1
and 2.
• For interpretation 1, R is defined as
̟0(y)
̟1(y)
<
b
a
, (20)
that is the Null Hypothesis is rejected if the Bayes Factor of H0 over H1 is small
enough.
• For interpretation 2, R becomes,
Pr(H0 ∪H∗0 |y)
Pr(H1|y) =
Pr(HC1 |y)
Pr(H1|y) <
b
a
, (21)
where H0 is the null hypothesis, H
∗
0 the indifference region where it is not worth to
abandon the null because the improvement is not enough, and H1 the alternative of
practical significance. This assumes that the loss of rejecting H0 under H0 and H
∗
0 is
the same, and that the loss for accepting H0 both under H0 and H
∗
0 is zero.
We put forward that (21) is more reasonable than, rejecting the null when
Pr(H0|y)
Pr(H1|y) < 1/3,
say, (an approach popular in medical statistics), since it may happen than P (H0|y) =
0.1ε and P (H1|y) = 0.9ε, and ε can be minute, like ε = 0.001. If both posterior
probabilities are minute, you should not abandon H0 in favor of H1.
Finally, for the simple and simplistic point masses at θ0 and θ1 the optimal rule be-
comes,
f(y|θ0)
f(y|θ1) < b/a. (22)
1.7 Relaxing the Assumptions: Predictive Priors Matching
In the proof of Lemma 1, it was assumed that the weights be proper, i.e.
∫
Θj
πj(θ)dθ = 1.
This may be seen as a too heavy an assumption. Fortunately, the assumption can be relaxed,
at least for (non-proper) weights which are improper but predictively matched, see for example
Pericchi (2005) for a discussion of predictively matched priors. We give two illustrations of
predictively matched priors.
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1. Illustration 1: Let us consider the prior Jeffreys suggested for the Normal mean testing
problem: H0 : µ = µ0 VS H1 : µ 6= µ0 and the variances are unknown. Jeffreys priors
for this problem are:
πJ0 (σ0) =
1
σ0
and
πJ1 (µ, σ1) =
1
σ1
· 1
πσ1(1+µ2/σ21)
.
Notice that the priors are not proper. We call a training sample of minimal size x(l),
a sub-sample of x such that both πJ0 (σ0|x(l)) and πJ1 (µ, σ1|x(l)) are proper, that is,
the priors integrate 1, but any sub-sample of x(l) will not. In this illustration case the
minimal training size is one, that is x(l) = xl. It turns out that Jeffreys priors are
predictively matched (Pericchi, 2005), that is, for whatever xl,
∫
f(xl|σ0)πJ0 (σ0)dσ0 =
∫
f(xl|µ, σ1)πJ1 (µ, σ1)dµdσ1,
or m0(xl) = m1(xl).
2. Illustration 2: Suppose you wish to compare a Normal model with a Cauchy model both
with location µ and location σ unknown. For location-scale models the objective prior
is usually chosen as π(µ, σ) = 1/σ. It turns out, see Berger, Pericchi and Varshavsky
(1998) that for any location-scale likelihood, the minimal training sample size is 2,
x(l) = (xl1 , xl2) and it turns out that,∫
1
σ3
· f((xl1 − µ)/σ)f((xl2 − µ)/σ)dµdσ =
1
2|xl2 − xl1 |
,
that is the predictive for any two different data point, is the same for any location-scale
family, and thus, if the prior is 1/σ any location-scale family is predictively matched
to any other location-scale family for the minimal training sample of 2 observations.
Corollary 1 For priors which does not integrate 1, but are predictively matched, Lemma 1
still holds.
Proof: Take an arbitrary minimal training sample x(l), so that the remaining sample is
denoted y x(−l). Now use the priors π0(θ0|x(l)) and π1(θ1|x(l)), and corresponding likeli-
hoods f0(x(−l)|θ0) and f1(x(−l)|θ1) in Lemma 1. Assuming we have a sample bigger than
the minimal training sample, then Lemma 1 follows with the priors and likelihoods above.
Now the result follows from the following identity, for predictively matched priors:
∫
f0(x(−l)|θ0)π0(θ0|x(l))dθ0∫
f1(x(−l)|θ1)π1(θ1|x(l))dθ1 =
∫
f0(x|θ0)π0(θ0)dθ0∫
f1(x|θ1)π1(θ1)dθ1 .
This Corollary, enlarge substantially the applicability of Lemma 1 and highlights the funda-
mental importance of predictively matched priors.
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2 Two Sided Alternatives Example 2:
This is an univariate Normal Example with known variance σ20 and the hypothesis center on
the mean θ:
H0 : θ = θ0 VS H1 : θ 6= θ0.
2.1 Bayesian Intrinsic Prior:
One objective Bayes approach is the Intrinsic Prior approach. For this hypothesis calculation
it turns out that the Intrinsic Prior is (Berger and Pericchi(1996) and Pericchi (2005)):
π1(θ) = N(θ|θ0, 2σ20) and π0 is a Dirac Delta at point θ0. Calculation yields that the optimal
test δ∗ is: Reject H0 if
f(y¯|θ0)
̟1(y¯)
=
N(y¯|θ0, σ20/n)
N(y¯|θ0, σ20(2 + 1/n))
< r, (23)
where n is the sample size.
2.2 Practical Significance:
Assume that the test is aimed to detect a difference if θ1 = θ0 ±∆. The the simplistic prior
weight is a Dirac Delta centered at the two points θ0 ±∆ with weight equal to 1/2 on each
point. The test now becomes: Reject H0 if
f(y¯|θ0)
̟∗1(y¯)
=
N(y¯|θ0, σ20/n)
1
2
N(y¯|θ0 −∆, σ20/n) + 12N(y¯|θ0 +∆, σ20/n)
< r, (24)
which can be written as
exp(−n∆
2σ20
[∆− 2(y¯ − θ0)]) + exp(−n∆
2σ20
[∆ + 2(y¯ − θ0)]) > 2
r
,
a reasonable criterion, that can be compared with the usual significance test which is ex-
tremely biased against H0 for sample sizes which are larger than the carefully designed
sample sizes to achieve a specified Type I and Type II errors.
A more careful analysis of indifference regions, using the same Intrinsic prior as above lead
us to the following rejection region:
Pr(H0,∆|y)
1− Pr(H0∆|y) < b/a, (25)
where H0,∆ = [θ0 −∆, θ0 +∆]. The resulting criteria is extremely simple, based in the ratio
of two Normal Probabilities, that takes specific account of the indifference region. It can be
verified that all tests (23), (24) and (25), are consistent as the sample size n grows. That is
both type I and type II errors go to zero as the sample size grows.
Now, the alternative paradigm enjoys several desirable properties, some of which we proceed
to describe.
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3 Now Hypothesis Testing under the new paradigm
obeys the Likelihood Principle.
One of the usual criticisms against significance testing is that it does not obey the Likelihood
Principle, a Principle not only shared by Bayesians, but that was actually enunciated or
defended by eminent non-Bayesians. Loosely speaking the Likelihood Principle establishes
that if two likelihoods are proportional to each other, the information about the parameter
vector θ is the same. The following important example is eloquent.
3.1 Example 3: Lindley and Phillips (1976) Example revisited:
It is desired to test if a coin is balanced, since it is suspected that it is more prone to Heads:
H0 : θ = 1/2, VS H1 : θ > 1/2.
It is known that the number of Heads is S = 9 and the number of tails is n − S = 3. It
is desired to conduct a test at α = 0.05, shall we reject the Null. The astonishing fact is
significance testing (in its two current versions, based on p-values or fixed significance) can
not decide. How the sample size was decided? It was fixed beforehand? Or it was decided
that the experiment would stop at the third tail? Or the statistician stopped when her door
was knocked by a student? The answers are not the same!
Suppose that n = 12 was decided beforehand, then we have a binomial likelihood,
fB(S|θ) = 12!
9!3!
θ9(1− θ)3 = 220θ9(1− θ)3, (26)
but if the experiment was stopped at the third tail, we have a Negative Binomial experiment,
fNB(S|θ) = 11!
9!2!
θ9(1− θ)3 = 55θ9(1− θ)3, (27)
that is we have two proportional likelihood functions, and according to the Likelihood Prin-
ciple we should have the same inference. However, the observed p-values differ:
αB = Pr(S ≥ 9|θ = 0.5,Binom) =
12∑
S=9
fB(S|θ = 0.5) = 0.073,
while
αNB = Pr(S ≥ 9|θ = 0.5,NegBinom) =
∞∑
S=9
fNB(S|θ = 0.5) = 0.0327,
thus the results are statistically significant in the second scenario but not in the first. We
have not attempted to model the third situation that someone knocks at your door making
you to stop, but the result will surely be still different, with the same outcome!
Examples like these seem to have convinced many that frequentist Hypothesis Testing is
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bound to violate the Likelihood Principle. The good news, surprising to many we would
guess, is that the violation of the Likelihood Principle is avoided by DeGroot’s method, that
is if the weighted sum of type I and type II errors is minimized.
Corollary 1. Testing by Minimizing a weighted sum of errors, automatically obeys the
Likelihood Principle.
Proof: From Lemma 1, the optimal test is Reject H0 if
̟0(y)
̟1(y)
=
∫
Θ0
f(y|θ)π0(θ)dθ∫
Θ1
f(y|θ)π1(θ)dθ < b/a,
and in the ratio of the left hand side, the constant in the likelihood cancel out.
Example 3 (Continued) In this example we are going to assume the Uniform Prior in
(0.5, 1), π(θ) = 2× 1(0.5,1)(θ). We assume this prior for simplicity although we do not think
it is ”optimal” in any sense, it is not unreasonable and does not influence the outcome
heavily. Then the ratio of evidences is easily found numerically,
f(S|θ = 0.5)∫ 1
0.5
f(S|θ) · 2dθ
=
(1/2)12
(1− pbeta(0.5|10, 4)×Beta(10, 4)× 2) = 0.366,
where pbeta(x|a, b) is the probability of a beta density, parameters a and b, from zero to x,
and Beta is the Beta function Beta(a, b) = Γ(a)·Γ(b)
Γ(a+b)
, a > 0, b > 0.
Thus according to Jeffreys table of evidence, the ratio is smaller than 1 but bigger that
1/
√
10 = 0.32, so there is mild evidence against H0.
The fact that traditional Hypothesis Testing depends, in unnatural ways, to the stopping
rule is one of its weakest links. It has far reaching consequences for example in clinical trials,
where quite often the trials has to be cut short for example for ethical reasons. Procedures
that depend on ratios of probabilities rather than tail probabilities are more realistic more
flexible and more ethical.
4 When Statistical Significance meets Practical Signif-
icance
One of the most criticized points of the current significance testing approach is the lack of
correspondence between practical significance and statistical significance. One such example
is in Freeman (1993).
4.1 Example 4: Freeman’s Example
Consider four hypothetical studies in which equal number of patients are given treatments
A and B and are asked which of them they prefer. The results are in the following table.
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Number of patients Number of patient Percentage two-sided Ratio of
receiving A and B preferring A:B preferring A P-value Evidences
20 15:5 75.00 0.04 0.42
200 115:86 57.50 0.04 1.85
2000 1046:954 52.30 0.04 6.75
2 000 000 1 001 445 : 998 555 50.07 0.04 219.66
As a weight function for the parameter θ an objective(and proper)prior is the Jeffreys’
prior,
πJ(θ) =
1
π
θ−1/2(1− θ)−1/2, for 0 < θ < 1.
Computation yields, that the ratio of evidences is
f(s|θ = 1/2)
̟(s)
=
π · 0.5N
Beta(s + 1/2, N − s+ 1/2) ,
which leads, see the 5th column in the table consistent with the conclusions put forward by
Freeman on intuitive grounds: the first trial is too small to permit reliable conclusions while
the last trial would be considered as evidence for rather than against equivalence, since for
any practical perspective the two treatments are equivalent. In fact the ratio gives ”decisive”
evidence or grade 5 in favor of the Null Hypothesis for 2 Million patients.
5 Is there Extra Sensorial Perception ESP? Or Just
Humongous Large Numbers?
In one of their books, Wonnacott and Wonnacott declared: ”Do you want to reject a hy-
pothesis? Take a large enough sample!”
5.1 Example 5: ESP Example:
The so called Extra-sensorial Experiment, Good (1992) is a good example how the p-values
are increasingly misleading with extremely large samples.
Example 5:Extra Sensorial Perception: ESP or no ESP? Here the question is if a
”gifted” individual can change the proportion of 0’s and 1’s, that are emitted with ”perfectly”
balanced proportions. So the Null is no change in the proportion against some change or:
H0 : θ = 1/2 VS H1 : θ 6= 1/2. We have a Huge sample: N = 104, 490, 000; Successes:
S = 52, 263, 471; Ratio: S/N = 0.5001768;
The p-value against the null is minute: pval = 0.0003, leading to a compelling rejection
of H0.
On the other hand an objective (proper) prior exists here, which is the Jeffrey’s prior, that
may be used as a weight function: (Jeffreys’) Prior: πJ(θ) = 1
π×
√
θ(1−θ)
. Then the Bayes
Factor, or the ratio of evidences, is
BH0,H1 =
f(data|θ = 1/2)∫
f(data|θ)πJ(θ)dθ =
π · (1/2)N
Be(S + 0.5, N − S + 0.5) =
14
∆ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005
r 2.15 169 397877 51369319698
Table 1: Table for different values of ∆
BH0,H1 = exp(2.93) = 18.7,
which is a strong support of the null hypothesis. (The Bayes factor is equal to 12 for the
Uniform prior, also a strong support of the Null)
Taking the second route, of setting the apriori points of practical significance, we may
agree that say ∆, above or below the null can be acceptable as practical significance. In
general call ∆ the percent accepted as practical. The criterion now read as:
Pr(0.5−∆ < θ < 0.5 + ∆|data)/(1− Pr(0.5−∆ < θ < 0.5 + ∆|data)) < r = b/a. (28)
We run the ∆ from 0.0002 (or 0.02%) to 0.0005 or 0.05%. In Table 1 even for the smallest
∆ the ratio of likelihoods is bigger than one and for ∆ = 0.0005 it grows to compelling
evidence against H1. This is in sharp contrast with a p-value of 0.0003.
6 A General Inequality: the discrepancy between fixed
significance levels and minimizing sum of errors is
general
Even though the discrepancies between fixed significance levels and minimizing sum of errors
have been illustrated through examples, it is a general phenomenon, as shown in the following
result (See also, Birnbaum (1969) and Dempster (1997), for related results).
Lemma 2: For the optimal test δ∗ of Lemma 1, it turns out that:
α(δ∗)
1− β(δ∗) ≤
b
a
.
Proof: First notice that the rejection region for the test δ∗ can be written as: R = ̟1(y)·b
̟0(y)·a ≥ 1.
Call the set S ⊂ R where ̟0(y) > 0 Now,
α(δ∗) =
∫
R
∫
Θ0
f0(y|θ)π0(θ)dθdy =
∫
S
̟0(y)dy =
≤
∫
S
̟1(y)b
̟0(y)a
̟0(y)dy =
b
a
∫
S
̟1(y)dy ≤ b
a
∫
R
̟1(y)dy =
b
a
(1− β(δ∗)).
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Corollary 2:
α(δ∗) ≤ b
a
.
Thus for example, if b/a = 20 then ̟1(y
∗)/̟0(y
∗) is considered equivalent to α(δ∗) = 0.05
and the power is 0.8 then
̟1(y
∗)
̟0(y∗)
≤ 1− β
α
=
.8
.05
= 16,
and the Corollary 2 that ̟1(y
∗)
̟0(y∗)
≤ 20, so DeGroot’s test rejects less often.
7 Conclusions
What emerges in the implementation and extensions of DeGroot’s approach to Testing Sta-
tistical Hypothesis, is a practical implementation of the ideas of Decision Theory with a
bridge between Bayesian and frequentist philosophies. This implementation, we argue along
with DeGroot, is superior to the two implementations dominant in practice: i) The use of
p-values with fixed cut points, like the ubiquitous: α-set[0.1∗, 0.05 ∗ ∗, 0.01 ∗ ∗∗], and ii) the
use of fixed Type I errors in the α-set, and then choosing the criterion to minimize Type II
error.
By doing i) or ii) you are in danger of having a minute effective Type II error relative to an
enormous Type I error. Furthermore, by fixing Type I error, inconsistency is obtained ”by
design”: no matter how informative the experiment is, you force the method to
have no-less than a Type I error in the α-set. On the contrary, minimizing the weighted
sum or errors, a more balanced (between two errors) method emerges and consistency flows
as a automatic consequence: By minimizing the sum of errors as evidence grows
you are letting both errors converge to zero so you have a consistent method.
As virtues of the approach we have a general theory of optimal testing, that obeys the Like-
lihood Principle and the Optional Stopping Principle, reconciles the disagreement between
schools of statistics and is more in line with the demands of the scientific method.
Finally, to achieve the benefits of the general theory, is not necessary to assume fully proper
priors: predictively matched improper priors suffices.
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9 Appendix 1: Jeffreys Table of Evidences
Here r = b/a
Grade 0 r ≥ 1 Null Supported
Grade 1 1 > r > 10−1/2 Mild Evidence against H0
Grade 2 10−1/2 > r > 10−1 Substantial Evidence against H0
Grade 4 10−1 > r > 10−3/2 Strong Evidence against H0
Grade 5 10−3/2 > r > 10−2 Very Strong Evidence against H0
Grade 6 10−2 > r Decisive Evidence against H0
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